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Questioning Western Approaches to
Religion in the Former Yugoslavia
Remise en question de l’opérationnalisation occidentale de la religion en ex-
Yougoslavie
Bojan Aleksov
1 The role of religion in the Yugoslav crisis, as well as in the lengthy and still ongoing
tensions following its dissolution, has been the matter of continuous and at times hefty
debate. More specifically, a number of studies have clearly demonstrated not only the
manipulation of religion in the hands of nationalists but also the tacit support that
churches and religious communities lent to warring factions in the former Yugoslavia.1
Others characterised the involvement of organised religion in the former Yugoslavia as
a  challenge  to  democratic  pluralism and  a  serious  threat  to  interethnic  peace  and
coexistence.  Looking  closer  at  most  of  these  accounts,  no  author  singled  out  the
essential features of religion, such as claims of truth or righteousness from God, but
rather the specific political uses that religious, and often nonreligious, actors made of
these claims. In the context of the overlap of ethnic and confessional boundaries among
South Slavs, these claims emphasised the differences and fostered ethno-confessional
homogenisation that underlied the rise of animosity, thus contributing to, rather than
causing,  the  escalation  of  conflict  and  protracted  tensions  thereafter.  Initially,  the
preponderant role of religion in Yugoslav conflict was attributed by foreign observers
to the country’s Orthodox-Byzantine and Islamic-Ottoman legacy, considered one of
the  chief  markers  that  distinguished  it  from  Western  Europe.  In  the  meantime,
historical  research  has  delegitimised  this  view,  offering  a  more  differentiated
approach,  especially  illuminating  the  contribution  of  nationalism  as  a  “Western”
import, which spurred the notorious identification of religion and nation among Serbs,
Croats  and,  more  recently,  Bosnyak  Muslims,  and  enthused  much  of  modern-day
conflicts among ex-Yugoslavia’s confessionally mixed populations.2 
2 The  last  few  decades  have  also  witnessed  the  resurgence  of  strength  of  organised
religion globally, which has been widely associated with the renewed visibility of the
concept of  civilisation,  whereby Islam, Christianity and so on are becoming central
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political categories, the so-called “frames of reference”, increasingly embedded in the
discourses  and  shaping  the  practices  of  both  religious  and  non-religious  actors  in
international  politics.3 While  this  trend  is  the  focus  of  much  of  the  burgeoning
scholarship,  there  has  been  little  empirical  analysis  of  the  particular  context  of
Yugoslav successor states, where the defeat or high cost of the nationalist projects of
the  1990s  also  saw the  rise  of  political  uses  of  religion in  their  aftermath as  their
continuations  or  substitutes.  Instead,  the  copious  body  of  literature  on  the  role  of
religion in the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s was significantly deepened only
with attempts to  trace the relations between local  Muslims and Islamic faith-based
organisations with their partners abroad, especially in the case of the so-called Islamic
connections.4 At  the  same  time,  the  interaction  between  religious  leaders  and
organisations  in  former Yugoslavia  and the West,  and the approaches  to  organised
religion by the West, have so far almost completely avoided scholarly examination. By
“West”, this article implies concrete actions and policies of major representatives or
organisations of a few West European countries and the USA, which were most heavily
involved in the Yugoslav conflict and its reconciliation. Given the fact that all of the
successor states of Yugoslavia have striven towards associating with Western military,
political and economic structures, be it by membership of NATO or the EU, “Western”
involvement, as defined above, requires the most scrutiny without denying the need to
explore “Islamic” or “Russian” connections. In order to address a number of ways in
which  the  Western  connections  with  local  religious  organisations  took  shape,  this
article  will  use  a  wide-ranging  notion  of  approaches  to  religion.  This  term  clearly
excludes  spiritual,  theological,  ecclesiastical  or  pastoral  links.  In  addition,  it  will
address  the  activities  aimed at  “inter-religious  dialogue”,  which until  recently  also
escaped the serious scrutiny and review processes that most other charitable and non-
governmental associations have undergone.5 The results of empirical research on the
political and social presence of religious organisations and interreligious activities by
scholars from the region will be combined with long-term observation of policies of
Western state and non-state actors in order to deduce causal  or simply cumulative
effects. 
3 The  following  undertaking  can  have  implications  for  other  conflict-ridden  regions
where Western involvement has experienced a similar shift towards engaging, reaching
out and connecting with religious groups and leaders. This noticeable shift, especially
in American foreign policy in recent decades, has followed the global resurgence of
religion, whose growing political salience in public life and international politics was
variably deemed to have started in the 1960s, 1979, at the end of Cold War or especially
after September 11, 2001.6 After sociologists and political scientists clearly established
that the public significance of religion, both in terms of practice and identity boundary,
was on the rise, rejecting previous secularisation theories,7 a decade later many studies
looked at its causes, manifestations and effects on international relations practices and
theory.8 In their recent book, Philpott, Shah and Toft emphasised that never before in
modern history did major religious actors enjoy greater capacity for political influence.
What is even more significant is that the resurgence of religion does not imply solely a
sociopolitical process, commonly known as politicization of  religion, whereby religious
actors develop activist political theologies and become more engaged in public debates
and political practices. As Bettiza demonstrated, it appears also as a religionization of
politics, whereby religious discourses and identities, and the practices and and symbols
associated with them, are  becoming more and more politically  salient  and publicly
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pervasive.9 Most  successor  states  of  Yugoslavia  provide  ample  evidence  of  both
sociopolitical processes. At the same time, the whole region was profoundly affected by
policies  and  interventions  of  the  Western  political,  educational,  humanitarian  and
media  agents  and agencies,  heavily  engaging with local  religious  organisations  and
actors as well. 
4 For  practical  purposes,  the  Western  approaches  to  organised  religion  in  former
Yugoslavia in this article will be divided into three mutually related and overlapping
areas: 
Symbolic promotion of religious leadership;
Political, legal and financial involvement and policies;
Fostering interfaith dialogue and reconciliation.
5 The  ensuing  analysis  will  examine  to  what  extent  policies  and  international
involvement  affect  ethno-confessional  segmentation,  political  attitudes  of  religious
leaders  and  institutions  and  contribute  to  the  goal  of  stabilisation  and  peaceful
reintegration of the region to Europe and the wider world, which most of them purport
to achieve. It will remain at macro-level, thus not accounting for eventual dissenting
individual actions or initiatives.
 
Symbolic promotion of religious leadership
6 Ever since conflicts erupted in what was still Yugoslavia in 1991, international – in most
cases Western – political actors introduced a completely novel practice of meeting local
religious  leaders,  which  by  now has  become a  ubiquitious  part  of  every  visit  from
power holders from the European Union and US, as well as part of the portfolio of their
permanent diplomatic representatives on the ground. Initially it was believed that the
religious leaders could act as mediators and call for peaceful solution, yet this hope
never  materialised.10 The  premise  to  consult  or try  to  influence  all  stakeholders,
including  confessional  leaders,  might  have  been  justified  given  the  authoritarian
tendencies of the rule of both Slobodan Milošević  and Franjo Tuđman, and the war
circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Yet  after the end of  fighting,  Serbia and
Croatia  (and  eventually  Bosnia  too)  saw  an  internationally  approved  democratic
transition.  Their  new  authorities  have  been  legitimate  and  cooperative,  but  the
contacts with religious leaders continued. 
7 This novel practice of engagement with religious leaders is  reminiscent of Ottoman
times and the so-called millet  system, in which confessional  leaders  indeed carried
secular  powers.11 However,  this  task  of  the  religious  hierarchies,  extinct  for  two
centuries, did not envisage national representation, as it predated the nation-building
epoch.  In  fact,  the  importance of  religious  leadership withered away once national
secular leaders emerged in the 19th century, while traditional millet segregation and
representation only contributed to the blurring of religious and national identities in
the region that is now again intensified. Therefore, its reasoning needs to be located
elsewhere. While a direct link could not be established, the Western representatives’
engagement with Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian religious leaders coincided with the major
shift  in  American  foreign  policy  with  the  passing  of  laws  and  creation  of  fora
advocating  religious  liberties  and  incorporating  religion  as  a  means  to  prevent  or
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Bettiza  termed  them,  are  influencing  and  transforming  religious  and  secular
landscapes  worldwide.13 As  Sam  Brownback,  Trump  administration  Ambassador-at-
Large for International Religious Freedom, explained after his recent 10-day tour of the
region, while much of the nature of the centuries-long Balkans conflict (sic) centred
around a division based upon different faiths, the moment has now come as there is the
right religious and political leadership “to build that long-term, durable foundation for
peace.”14 Thus, we note that after half a century of forced and prolonged exclusion of
religious leaders from political decision-making during Communist rule in Yugoslavia,
the Western contacts have added symbolic weight to their ever-growing prominence in
post-Yugoslav states.  Thanks to ample media coverage, consciously or inadvertently
this practice contributes to promoting local religious hierarchs into national leaders
although  they  officially  wield  no  political  power  in  secular  and  democratic  states
created after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Moreover, both symbolically and literally, as in
the statement above, Western contacts distort the causes of conflicts and influence the
reconciliation by preselection of partners.
8 One explanation for the, by now ubiquitous, visits to bishops and muftis is that they
represent a sort of new secret diplomacy. Clearly, this constitutes more than a matter
of protocol or exercise in good manners and respect, as is evident from the frequent
preselection  of  religious  leaders  as  partners,  disregarding  strict  hierarchical  and
canonical regulations. In the case of Kosovo, whose status and position of its ethnic
groups  is  still  unresolved,  international  mediators  in  the  past  decades  switched
partners in the Serbian Orthodox Church from Patriarch(ate) to local bishop (Artemije)
to the heads of the biggest monastery, Dečani (abbots Sava and Teodosije, who replaced
the uncooperative Artemije as bishop), depending on their political aims and strategies.
Similarly,  international  representatives  choose  who  to  meet  between  the  two
hierarchies  of  the  Islamic  community  competing  for  power  in  Serbia.  More
questionable than the change of partners is the fact that among their selected partners,
one often comes across the same religious leaders who contributed to the escalation of
conflict and violence and who are now, in part due to this international recognition,
being promoted into political representatives and potential reconciliators. In the most
detailed study on the topic to date, Klaus Buchenau has shown how the leaderships of
the two biggest churches, Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic, actively participated
in  delegitimising  the  Yugoslav  state  and  eventually  supported  the  creation  of
homogeneous national states in which they would cherish religious dominance.15 Both
church hierarchies stood by their respective political leadership, even when this was
almost certainly leading into war, as is evident in their official declaration in support of
independence or separation.16 During the wars, together with the Islamic community
leadership, they supported the participation of their flock as just and defensive. Finally,
as  another  of  Buchenau’s  investigation  of  the  two  churches’  rapport  with  the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague shows,
after  the end of  violence,  religious  leaders  actually  slowed down the reconciliation
process  by  nourishing  a  critical  stance  toward  the  tribunal.17 By  condemning  the
pressure to bring war criminals to justice, these religious leaders have perpetuated the
victimhood  myth,  one  of  their  key  discursive  tools  when  addressing  the  faithful,
whereby  only  churches  or  religious  communities  feature  as  guardians  in  times  of
trouble and threat to the nation. To give just one example, Metropolitan Amfilohije of
the Serbian Orthodox Church praised Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal
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Radovan Karadžić  as the best Serbian son and compared him to Christ on Golgotha
prosecuted by the same kind of people as the ones who crucified Christ.18 
9 If one is to excuse the Western leaders of ignorance in their practice or selection of
religious leaders they meet, that cannot be said of international organisations that are
active in the region, such as the interfaith charity Soul of Europe or the German Konrad
Adenauer  Foundation,  which  reaffirm  the  same  policy  of  meeting  and  promoting
religious leaders, rather than projects involving grassroots believers. 
 
Political, legal and financial involvement and policies
10 Yugoslavia’s  state-endorsed atheism  after  1945  had  profound  secularising  effects,
although  the  early  socialist  rule  also  “naturalised”  equations  of  national  and
confessional  categories  by  their  joint  supression.  From  the  late  1980s,  however,
Yugoslavia  and  its successor  states  have  undergone  huge  changes  in  respect  to
previously discriminated and repressed religious organisations and rights of believers.
In addition to changes in laws that boosted the economic and social status of religious
organisations, there was a drastic change in the attitude of media, courts and various
government  agencies  in  handling  matters  involving  religion  and  clerics.  Religious
organisations are relieved from tax obligations, and their representatives have often
enjoyed immunity  from civil  authorities,  sometimes even in  serious  criminal  cases,
such as numerous cases of paedophilia in both Serbia and Croatia. 
11 From  the  1990s,  the  legal  framework  of  religious  organisations  analysed  here  was
modified along Western models,  or  more precisely along models  of  the existing EU
members.  The  close  church–state  relationship  that  emerged  in  most  Yugoslav
successor states is situated between the state church model found in countries such as
Greece and the model of separation and cooperation, as for example in Germany and
Austria,  where  churches  are  endowed  with  a  variety  of  social  tasks.19 In  Serbia,  a
hitherto  unknown  legal  concept  of  “traditional  churches”  for  seven religious
communities  was  modelled  on  the  Austrian  law  on  religious  associations,  and  was
clearly distinct from the previously existing notion of unlimited religious pluralism.20
In  Croatia,  in  1996–97,  four  government  contracts  with  the  Holy  See  were  ratified
covering  all  areas  of  life,  despite  serious  objections  to  their  constitutionality.21
According to their provisions, in addition to the usual legalisation of (Catholic) church
wedding and catechism in state schools and nurseries, the Church acquired the status
of  a  legal  person,  getting  the  right  to  open  schools,  with  the  state  assuming  the
obligation to support them. Furthermore, the priests of the Catholic Church entered
the Croatian army and police, becoming state employees, while the decisions of church
courts were forwarded to state courts, which were to implement their civil effects. In
the  case  of  a  court  investigation  in  which  a  member  of  the  clergy  is  involved,
prescribed  by  Criminal  Law,  the  court  is  obliged  to  inform  the  competent  Church
authorities  about  it  before  it  takes  action.  In  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  too,  the
constitutional  provisions  of  religious  freedoms  and  equality  were  overridden  by
bilateralism  through  which  all  issues  regarding  religious  denominations  have  been
regulated by later legislations based on agreeements between the state and specific
confessions.22 While details of new church and state arrangements might differ across
former Yugoslavia, a common trait is an arrangement where the dominant (majority
ethnic)  religious  community  is  privileged  by  the  state,  while  other  religious
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communities are more or less tolerated. Dominant religious communities are further
entrusted with organising religious catechism in all  levels  of  state school,  with the
system criticised as exclusivist, discriminatory and contributing to the polarisation of
ethno-confessional differences.23 
12 In addition, many political and social requirements concomitant with the accession to
the European Union, from restitution of private property to commemoration of the
Holocaust  or  World  War  II  genocide,  opened  new  avenues  for  social  and  political
engagement of religious organisations dominated by their hierarchies, fortifying their
position within nascent democratic states. Most were explained by the need to account
for the actions of the Communist authorities, who deprived religious organisations of
power and property. “There is no integration in Europe without righting the wrongs
from the past”, exclaimed Belgrade Catholic Archbishop Hočevar.24 Yet sometimes the
righting of  the wrongs involves  new discrimination.  The Law on the Restitution of
Property adopted by the Serbian Parliament in 2006 foresaw, with regard to the church,
the complete restitution of its property, while the return of nationalised property to
private individuals is still pending. 
13 Western foundations, such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation close to the German
Christian  Democratic  party,  contributed  to  the  new  positioning  of  religious
organisations in Yugoslavia’s successor states, and strengtherned their hierarchies and
officials  through  regular  contacts,  training  sessions  and  seminars,  translations  of
Western  publications  and  transfer  of  ideas  and  models.25 In  Bosnia,  World  Vision
became the most active Christian charity supporting religious organisations in Bosnia,
dispensing aid through three major religious organisations, including financing field
trips  for  catechists  to  foreign  countries  or  events  that  clearly  cement  ethno-
confessional identification.26 It is this kind of Western support to religious projects and
activities that raises eyebrows, given the regular and increasing financial support of
religious  organisations  from  respective  state  budgets  after  the  aforementioned
changes, and especially given the widespread dissatisfaction with, and distrust of, the
ways  religious  leaderships  use  and  distribute  their  resources.  Most  religious
organisations in former Yugoslavia have been directing aid primarily to individuals
who  are  at  least  nominally  members  of  their  denominations.  During  the  siege  of
Sarajevo,  the  Adventist  Church  humanitarian  organization  ADRA  was  the  only  one
delivering aid regardless of confessional background or lack thereof. Moreover, there
are numerous reports of financial abuse and corruption, for example in the Serbian
Church.27 Furthermore, as already mentioned religious organisations are exempt from
state  financial  control  and taxation, which leads  to  huge  tax  evasion and financial
manipulations. The most notorious example is that of Medjugorje, the site of alleged
Virgin apparitions. The biggest pilgrimage site in former Yugoslavia rose to third most
visited Roman Catholic site in the world but remains unofficial and in an economic grey
zone.  Asja  Hadžiefendić-Mešić  from Bosnia’s  Tourism organisation  claims  that  only
18,600 nights were recorded from the estimated 4–5 million nights spent by around 1.5
million pilgrims a year.28
14 Vast funds also arrive for religious organisations from the West as donations by the
Serbian/Croatian/Bosnyak diaspora. Sandžak Mufti Muamer Zukorlić  recently raised
many eyebrows stressing that he would only accept donations above 500 € during a
fund-raising  event  in  Luxembourg  for  a  village  cultural  centre.29 Thereby  Zukorlić
compared this project with the tallest mosque in the Balkans, which he recently built in
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the remote village of Delimeđe, home to no more than 300 people but boasting two
minarets  reaching  80  metres  in  height.  The  support  from  abroad,  state  aid  and
privileged legal status have turned religious organisations into powerful institutions.
Let us take the example of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Hercegovina, which serves
around 550 thousand Croats (80% of whom declared as believers) and boasts 840 priests
and 540 nuns and manages hundreds of educational and other facilities. In terms of
media presence, they command four monthly newspapers and a weekly one, 19 radio
stations, and three private television stations.30 The Serbian Orthodox Church built five
hundred churches from 1991 to 2011 and is continuing to build more.31 The Islamic
Community in Bosnia has also built over five hundred new mosques since the war, in
addition to the reconstruction of over a thousand mosques and other religious building.
32 On the other hand, after more than four decades of restricted activities, religious
organisations have been very slow and partial in engaging their clergy or faithful in
social and caritative work, especially on a voluntary basis. Some attempts to engage in
rehabilitation of drug addicts became notorious for the use of torture and killing in one
of them.33 
15 The  above  leaves  out  the  most  salient  example  of  Western  political  and  financial
involvement, namely the reconstruction of places of worship destroyed or damaged
during  conflicts.  This  was  accorded  priority  by  the  Western  goverments  and  aid
agencies as an investment in reconciliation led by a common belief that the destruction
of  cultural  heritage  should  be  mitigated  by  its  rebuilding,  i.e.  creating  a  common
cultural heritage as envisaged in Annex 8 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. In 1996, the
European Council adopted a resolution stating that the protection of cultural heritage
was  of  importance  for  the  social  and  economic  development  in  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina. European Union agencies, individual European countries and American
agencies also footed the bill for the reconstruction of Orthodox churches damaged in
Kosovo and led the way in Bosnia, although later on majority Muslim countries and
especially Turkey were spearheading the reconstruction and building of Islamic place
of  worship  throughout  the  region  guided  by  purely  religious  principles.34 The
reconstruction of war-damaged, and rebuilding of destroyed, churches and mosques
raised many controversies  as  places  of  worship were reconstructed or  rebuilt  even
when there were no faithful to use them, with the donors insisting on the argument for
their  symbolic  importance.  The symbolism was  nevertheless  often lost  as  places  of
worship were (re)built in different style and scale. Furthermore, no transparent policy
existed  for  prioritisation  of  places  of  worship  rather  than  homes  or  schools  or
hospitals. Finally, giving priority to the reconstruction of religious buildings appeared
to  confirm  the  notion  that  violence  and  destruction  were  committed  entirely  on
religious grounds, so the religious dimension of the war and conflict was elevated and
reified as their primary cause. Later on, as described by Višnja Kisić, the EU shelved the
troubling questions of guilt, justice and peace, which the reconstruction of religious
buildings ought to symbolise,  in favour of  growth or within the frames of  a liberal
market  economy.35 As  the  symbolism  of  ethnic  cleansing,  war,  exclusion  and
destruction could not be replaced by a positive notion of religious buildings as a shared
cultural heritage, the interpretative focus changed to heritage reconstruction as job
creation and economic development, although the outcome of the latter is similarly
difficult to ascertain. 
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Fostering interfaith dialogue and reconciliation
16 While  the  potential  and  benefits  of  interfaith  dialogue  in  former  Yugoslavia  are
frequently lauded, we know much less about its outcome due to a lack of systematic
research  based  on  empirical  studies  and  lessons  learned.36 Before  and  during  the
conflict in the 1990s, the most obvious focus in interfaith dialogue was placed on the
meetings and negotiations at the highest level. On two occasions the meetings were
organised between the Serbian Patriarch Pavle and Croatian Cardinal Kuharić,  when
the only outcome was two declarations that could hardly testify to their respective
churches’ attitudes towards the war described above. In addition to the recent conflict,
the  two Church leaderships  contest  representations  of  World  War  II.37 Seventy-five
years  after  its  end,  and  fifty  years  into  their  dialogue,  the  Catholic  and  Serbian
Orthodox Church have not moved the slightest bit in their approach to the events of
World War II, which is still the greatest stumbling block in their relations, as lamented
by the  Apostolic  Nuncio  in  Belgrade.38 The  number  of  World  War  II  victims in  the
interpretation  of  the  two  sides  differ  up  to  ten-fold,  not  to  mention  the  image  of
perpetrators  and victims that  the two Churches  generate.39 The Catholic  Church in
Croatia has for years refused to send official representatives to the commemorations of
the victims of the Ustaša terror. When, in 2009, Zagreb Cardinal Božanić finally came to
the biggest Ustaša concentration camp of Jasenovac, he stopped short of visiting the
actual  monument site.  Apologising,  Božanić  instead equated Ustaša and Communist
crimes.40 In fact,  things are getting worse with the process of turning World War II
Croatian Cardinal Stepinac into a saint, whereas many in the Serbian Church consider
him to be a war criminal. On the other hand, the latter canonised its bishop Nikolaj
Velimirović  despite  his  notorious  anti-Semitism  and  links  to  the  Serbian  Fascist
movement Zbor Leader Ljotić.41 Similarly, the representatives of the non-government
sector in Croatia  in a  letter  to  Pope Francis  expressed their  concern regarding the
opposition of  Cardinal  Bozanić  and Catholic  bishops  to  the  use  of  Cyrillic  script  as
envisaged by law, fearing that it  might lead to a deepening of the conflict between
Croats and Serbs rather than contribute to reconciliation and the building of lasting
peace.42 After condemnation by the Serbian bishops,  in February 2019,  the Croatian
Catholic Bishops’ Conference published an open letter to the Serbian Patriarch that laid
bare  all  conflicts between  the  two  churches  and  documented  a  total  lack  of
communication  and  common  ground  that  could  serve  as  a  basis  for  future
reconciliation efforts.43 While the dialogue among Christians died, the one with Muslim
leaders never even began in earnest. 
17 Moving away from two church leaderships to bodies and initiatives specifically made
with the intent of interfaith dialogue, the most articulated and internationally known
is the Interreligious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina (),  created in 1998 upon the
initiative of the New York-based World Conference of Religions for Peace, the largest
international  interfaith  enterprise.  Still  active  thanks  to  political,  financial  and
logistical  support  by  Konrad Adenauer  Foundation,  Mott  Foundation,  World  Vision,
British Council, and the Norwegian and US governments among others, with five full-
time staff, in its agenda it aims to decrease religious prejudice and raise awareness of
the  importance  of  inter-religious  dialogue  and  cooperation  and  promote  the
improvement of their relationship with the State. American patronage of the Council is
often reiterated, and their activities couched in the paradigm of freedom of religion.
Questioning Western Approaches to Religion in the Former Yugoslavia
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 1 | 2020
8
Ambassador Patrick Moon met the leaders of the Council to express his support for
their efforts at property restitution and health and pension benefits for clergy.44 When
opening  a  three-day  meeting  of  women believers  in  Trebinje,  Bosnia,  Steve  Gillen,
Political  Officer  of  the  US  Embassy  in  Sarajevo  insisted  that,  drawing  on  his  own
experience  as  a  Roman  Catholic,  believers  contribute  to  the  strengthening  of  civil
society.45 In  meetings  that  the  Council  organises  between  American  diplomats  and
religious  leaders,  the  latter  often  express  their  grievances  and  lobby  for  their  co-
religionists (often against other confessions).46
18 Unfortunately, the representatives of the Council were not available or interested in
interviews.  Their  publications  and  reports  testify  about  numerous  seminars  and
conferences organised, relying on the work of very few clergymen of each confession
and their associates, or often on family members. Council events often bring together
religious leaders in Bosnia, but for formal ocasions or common stand against state and
other actors, rather than interaction, exchange and eventually mutual rapprochement.
Their  longest  running project  is  on  monitoring  and reporting  assaults  on religious
buildings and officials, which falls within American foreign policy on religious freedom.
In addition,  with the help of  the Adenauer Foundation,  the Council  established the
Institute for the Study of Interreligious Dialogue, whose agenda is,  however,  purely
academic, and which has so far organised conferences and produced one anthology of
texts from various authors. Its focus again is on religious rights and the protection of
religious values.47 The organisation of encounters for young theology students is the
first move into widening the participation from religious leaders to future religious
leaders and pastoral carers.48 Yet it remains to be seen how open and exploratory these
students  can  be,  knowing  the  strict  hierarchical  structure  of  all  three  religious
organisations they stem from and what the process of becoming a priest/imam entails.
Whereas my attempts failed, Fetahagić and Šavija conducted comprehensive research
on the activities of the Council as part of their bigger study on interreligous relations in
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  In  conclusion,  the  rapports  between  the  three  dominant
religious  organisations  were  characterised  as  being  coloured  by  a  nationalist-
chauvinist agenda and by maintaining a balance between cooperation and antagonism
in order not to affect power relations within religious organisations themselves and
one versus the other.  The only policy advice for the improvement of  interreligious
relations could be found in engaging young and grassroots activists  away from the
existing structures, as established hierarchies would obstruct any questioning of their
power. Similarly, the researchers found that the religious leaders at the top of their
oganisations and in the Council were increasingly passive, whereas local lower rank
clerics  were  more  active  in  developing  and maintaining  good relations  accross  the
religious divide.49 Unfortunately, foreign and/or Western involvement usually relies on
established hierarchies,  and often perpetuates  and strengthens  the  power  relations
within religious organisations. 
19 Another actor in the field is the Faith Foundation set up by Tony Blair, who claimed
that the role of religion in conflict had become a diplomatic blind spot compared to the
efforts spent to analyse disputes in terms of ideology, economics and ethnic tensions.
While this might be a legitimate claim in some contexts, the role of religious belief in
the conflict in Kosovo, where his foundation operates, seems grossly exaggerated, if not
imposed by Blair and other foreign actors. Charlotte Keenan, the Chief Executive of the
Tony Blair Faith Foundation, portrayed the nature of conflict in Kosovo as “a reminder
of how old nightmares can rise from the deep freezer of history. Yugoslavia buried the
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idea of national and religious identity, but it sprang back to life with dark and brutal
savagery.”50 Despite the academic concensus against this interpretation of the Kosovo
conflict and the reification of religion, with the support of the British Council and the
Kosovo  Foreign  Ministry,  the  Tony  Blair  Faith  Foundation  proceeded  to  organise
conferences with international high-profile participants, while at the same time doing
little if anything towards reconciliation on the local level for the benefit of both the
faithful and many more of those whose religious affiliation was less or not pronounced
at all.51 Eventually,  in Kosovo, similarly to Bosnia,  interconfessional relations barely
reach beyond protocol visits and the exchange of greetings on the occasion of major
holidays. 
20 Contrary to the approach of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, the Centre for the Study
of  Religion,  Politics,  and  Society  from  Novi  Sad  (many  of  whose  projects  were
undertaken  under  the  patronage  of the  (American)  National  Endowment  for
Democracy) stated in response to enquiry for this article that they had limited positive
experience with faith-based actors, and mainly with the Mennonites and other fringe
Protestant groups. According to this Centre, religious hostility came on top of already
existing  political/economic  instability  and  other causes  (mostly  nationalist)  and
religions only provided a set of symbols to deepen the conflict but not to initiate it. As
for the dialogue between religious leaders, their position is that religious leaders can
only contribute but not head conflict resolution, as they usually have no access to key
resources and to the issues which are at the heart of the conflict. 
21 Besides more permanent organisations and initiatives, hundreds of other conferences
and  gatherings of  religious  leaders  are  organised  by  various  other  actors.  The
international  meeting  “Sarajevo  2012”,  organised  by  the  Catholic  Community  of
Sant’Egidio,  was  advertised as  the  greatest  conference  of  religious  and  political
dialogue  since  the  end  of  the  1992  war.52 Paid  for  by  the  Italian  Government  and
European  Union,  hundreds  if  not  thousands  of  religious  leaders  of  all  faiths,  and
personalities from the world of culture and politics from more than sixty countries,
were flown to Sarajevo to address the most urgent issues of today’s society, coexistence
and peace,  as  the organisers  announced.  Massively and pompously staged,  this  and
similar gatherings raise many questions. First of all, who and on what basis draws up
the list of participants, which included bishops never relieved of paedophilia charges,
who  were  eventually  forced  to  resign.53 Despite  the  organisers’  efforts,  the  public
reception was muted or manipulated by the media in the region, most of whom report
along ethno-confessional lines. Finally, the three days of celebration of bringing leaders
of different denominations together were overshadowed by the angry polemic between
Serbian  Bishop  Grigorije  of  Mostar  and  Bosnian  Reis-ul-ulema  Mustafa  Cerić.54
Similarly, the Ministry of Culture of (Former Yugoslav Republic) North Macedonia with
support from UNESCO, the World Islamic League and the World Conference of Religions
for  Peace  also  organised  several  world  conferences  on  interreligious  dialogue  with
hundreds of faith leaders in its Ohrid resort, but besides official conference proceedings
volumes it remains difficult to establish any other outcome of these costly gatherings.55
Vaguely conceived and without concrete follow-up, these conferences remain fora for
encounter and promotion but not for resolving issues that put religious organisations
against each other. 
22 Based on the existing research and evidence, the patterns of interfaith relationships
that emerge throughout former Yugoslavia are declarative, ceremonial or scholastic.
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Besides big international conferences, religious hierarchs meet only when they invite
each  other  to  celebrations.  Occasionally,  theologians  give  lectures  on  each  other’s
theological  schools.  While  some  projects,  such  as  student  exchange  launched  by
Sarajevo Interreligious Council, are praiseworthy, usually the Council serves as a forum
for  the  three  major  religious  communities  to  express  their  views,  or  more  often
grievances, and jointly block any attempt to intrude on their positions. Similarly, in
other  successor  states,  religious  institutions  cooperate  on  common  goals  such  as
restitution of property or benefits to their catechists. On a few occasions when religious
hierarchies found common language, it served not to promote their mutual dialogue
and reconciliation or the proclaimed goal of religious freedom but to address issues
beyond their ranks, such as when all major confessions joined the Serbian Church in its
rejection of anti-discrimination law in Serbia because it included protection of sexual
minorities. 
 
Religious Organisations and Inter-religious Dialogue
Three Decades after the Beginning of Armed Conflicts 
23 Scholarship demonstrated that during the last three decades, religious organisations
and  leaders  in  Yugoslavia’s  successor  states  have  been  able  to  influence  political
debates and act on a variety of social issues from sexual education to youth camps or
theatre plays.56 Yet when it comes to their mutual relations, according to Fetahagić and
Šavija, they  remain  at  a  fragile  balance  between  cooperation  and  antagonism,
necessary  for  everyday  life,  while  never  challenging  structural  ethno-religious
divisions,  and  thus  supressing  rathen  than  resolving  any  conflicts.57 Based
on interventions in the spheres of education and politics, as well as public displays, the
research by Ljubić and Marko on the leadership of the three main confessional groups
in  Bosnia  saw  that  among  them,  dialogue,  understanding  or  consensus  is  entirely
absent.58 Bosnia’s two biggest churches and the Islamic community have only became
more closely intertwined with the respective ethnic and nationalist political parties of
Serbs,  Croats  and  Bosnian  Muslims  (Bosnyaks).  In  other  Yugoslav  successor  states,
there is  the same pattern combined with a very high level  of  declared religiosity.59
According to recent research conducted among 4,824 mostly young people from Serbia,
Bosnia and Croatia, those who are members of religious communities and hold religious
values are less prone to reconciliation, as is evident in the display of distrust, and the
refusal  to  cooperate,  forgive  and  rehumanise  former  enemies.60 The  principal
investigator Nebojša Petrović  explains this “paradox” by the overarching feature of
religion as identity marker. Most of those who openly declare religious affiliation are
religious not because they accept principles of faith, but in order to stress the only
difference between these three peoples or the religion’s role as boundary marker. 
24 The greatest responsibility for confessional polarisation remains on the shoulders of
higher religious leadership, and Fetahagić and Šavija clearly identify them as acting in
concert with exclusivist identity politics, imposing them down the line of command,
given the strict hierarchical structures of all major religious organisations. The main
narratives  of  both  religious  and  political  actors  exhaust  themselves  in  the  idea  of
biological  security  and  survival,  never  abandoning  strict  ethno-religious  identity
politics.  Also  common  to  all  religious  organisations  is  insistence  on  confessional
religious education in public schools (catechism) as a mainstay of their public presence
Questioning Western Approaches to Religion in the Former Yugoslavia
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 1 | 2020
11
and source of income. However, there is absolutely no evidence that these classes can
mitigate youth violence based on ethno-religious hostility.61 As the editors of one of the
volumes on politicisation of religion in Yugoslavia’s successor states point out in their
conclusion, the current state of affairs simply leads to the self-reproduction of religious
symbols  by  religious  institutions,  which  operate  as  their  own  judge,  jury  and
executioner.62 Warmongering by religious leaders might have disappeared,  but  hate
preaching is rampant. Following the public outings of some clerics, one can notice a
double talk approach whereby religious leaders refrain from extremist statements and
hate speech but do nothing to prevent or  disassociate from it  when it  comes from
circles  close  to  them.  Thanks  to  changes  in  the  last  three  decades,  all  religious
communities now flourish and are active in many spheres of life. There are hundreds of
religious charities, youth, women’s groups, religious media outlets, publishing houses,
cultural and rehabilitation centres and so on, which are all geared to function under
the  umbrella  of  their  religious  community  and  strictly  reflect  their  structures  and
views. These religious groups are in turn often closely allied with the nationalist and
right-wing groups  that  breed extremism.  When it  comes  to  politics  and “national”
issues, it is almost by default that the members of these lay or para-religious groups
express more extremist positions than the hierarchs, a practice already analysed with
the example of the Russian Orthodox Church.63 In cases of open hate speech, religious
organisations have been also reluctant to punish their representatives and would at
best move them to a different role or location.64 At the same time, those critical of
nationalism  in  church  ranks  were  removed  from  positions  in  teaching  and
responsibility.65 
25 While the role of religion in personal, spiritual and communal welfare is beyond the
scope  of  this  article,  the  Western  approaches  to  religion  during  and  following  the
armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia with a political agenda, sketched in this paper in
its  three  segments,  clearly  made  little  or  no  impact  on  the  ever-growing  ethno-
confessional  segmentation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  elsewhere  in  former
Yugoslavia,  or  on  the  progress  in  interreligious  dialogue.  Instead,  by  means  of
“religious”  diplomacy,  financing  religious  organisations  and  vaguely  or  poorly
conceived dialogue and stimulating adherence to  rules  and practices  established in
rather  different  contexts,  Western  state  and  non-state  actors  advertently  or
inadvertently  empower  established  religious  hierarchies  and  buttress  their
conservative attitudes, and eventually undermine the assumed goal of reconciliation
and peaceful reintegration of the region to Europe and the wider world. Any future
engagement needs to come to grips with, rather than ignore, the ever-growing nexus
between political and religious elites and organisations, as well as the inner workings of
major religious institutions.
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The paper examines to what extent the policies of the United States and West European countries
and  international  organisations  affect  ethno-confessional  segmentation,  political  attitudes  of
religious  leaders  and  institutions  and  contribute  to  the  goal  of  stabilisation  and  peaceful
reintegration of the successor states of former Yugoslavia to Europe and the wider world, which
most  of  them  purport  to  achieve.  It  does  so  by  three-tier  level  analysis  into:  1) Symbolic
promotion  of  religious  leadership;  2) Political,  legal  and  financial  involvement  and  policies;
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Cet article pose la question de la façon dont les politiques des États-Unis,  des pays d’Europe
occidentale et des organisations internationales affectent la segmentation ethno-confessionnelle,
les attitudes politiques des dirigeants et des institutions religieuses et contribuent à l’objectif de
stabilisation et de réintégration pacifique des États successeurs de l’ex-Yougoslavie dans l’Europe
et dans le monde, objectif que la plupart d’entre eux entendent atteindre. L’analyse se développe
à  trois  niveaux :  1) celui  de  la  promotion  symbolique  des  dirigeants  religieux ;  2) celui  des
Questioning Western Approaches to Religion in the Former Yugoslavia
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 1 | 2020
18
politiques et de l’implication politique, juridique et financière ; 3) celui de l’encouragement du
dialogue et de la réconciliation interconfessionnels.
INDEX
Geographical index: Yougoslavie
Mots-clés: ex-Yougoslavie, dialogue interconfessionnel, politicisation de la religion,
organisations religieuses




University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies
b.aleksov[at]ucl.ac.uk
Questioning Western Approaches to Religion in the Former Yugoslavia
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 1 | 2020
19
